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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to provide a deeper insight into the links be-
tween financial markets and the real economy. To that end, we study the
short-term anticipation and response of U.S. stock, Treasury, and corpo-
rate bond markets to the first release of U.S. macroeconomic information.
Specifically, we focus on the impact of these announcements not only on the
level, but also on the volatility and comovement of those assets’ returns. For
that purpose, we estimate several extensions of the parsimonious amended
GARCHmodel of Engle (2002) for the excess holding-period returns on seven
portfolios of these asset classes. We find that the process of price formation
in the U.S. financial markets appears to be driven by fundamentals; yet,
“excessive” volatility and comovement play an important role in return dy-
namics as well. Further, our analysis reveals a statistically and economically
significant dichotomy between the reaction of the stock and bond markets to
the arrival of unexpected fundamental information. However, we also show
that stock and bond returns tend to react to the expected component of
these announcements. This evidence casts some doubts on the eﬃciency of
the U.S. financial markets with respect to widely anticipated and tracked
releases of macroeconomic data. Overall, the above results often diﬀer from
earlier studies where the surprise portion of those releases was not identified,
and shed new light on the mechanisms by which information is incorporated
into prices.
JEL classification: C32; G14
Keywords: Volatility; Comovement; Information; Market Eﬃciency
1 Introduction
“Job report sends stocks and bonds sharply lower ...
The yield on the Treasury’s 10-year note ... shot up to 4.78%,
its highest in 22 months ... after the Labor Department said on
yesterday morning that 288, 000 new jobs were created in April,
about 100, 000 more than had been expected ...
Stocks fell initially, rebounded but then collapsed in the afternoon,
ending at their lows for the day ...”
Source: New York Times, May 8, 2004, page B1.
Despite the skepticism about newspaper accounts of financial market be-
havior among academics, there seems to be little doubt that the release of
macroeconomic news has a significant impact on prices of securities within
as diverse asset classes as stocks, Treasury bonds, and corporate bonds. For
instance, most asset pricing models provide a snapshot of the cross-sectional
relationship between asset returns (or prices) and risk factors at a given point
in time. A change in one or more of these factors should therefore aﬀect as-
set returns, with the dynamic nature of these changes being dictated by the
dynamics of new information arriving to the market. Consistently, basic eco-
nomic theory (see Andersen et al., 2004 for a review) suggests that asset price
changes should depend on news aﬀecting cash flows, discount rates, and risk
premia.
The dominant paradigm regarding the response of asset prices to new
information (first articulated by Fama, 1971) is that, since markets are eﬃ-
cient, asset prices should react immediately, and in an unbiased manner, to
new information. In the first two decades of modern empirical finance, since
the mid 1960s, the analysis of the response of market prices to micro, firm-
level, information led to the broad conclusion that the markets are indeed
eﬃcient, albeit to various degrees (weak, semi-strong, or strong). Therefore,
asset prices should generally react only to the unexpected portion of news,
and not to the part that has already been anticipated by the market. Yet, as-
sessing the net eﬀect of news arrivals on asset prices is diﬃcult, as the former
may have an impact on more than one of the fundamental factors driving the
latter. For example, the announcement of an increase in the unemployment
rate may be bad news for the economy (lower profitability) but good news
for short term interest rates, leaving the net eﬀect ambiguous. In addition,
the notion of market eﬃciency has been challenged in the past decade by the
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discovery of several anomalies, many of which are based on the psychology
of investors.1 Some recent studies even suggest that there may be a (possi-
bly rational) disconnect between the first and higher order moments of asset
returns and their fundamentals.2
In this paper, we intend to explore the functioning of the process of price
formation in the three main U.S. financial markets – stocks, government
bonds, and corporate bonds – around the dates of important macroeco-
nomic news events. In particular, we concentrate on employment, inflation,
and interest rate news. There is broad agreement that the level and dy-
namics of employment and inflation within a country adequately capture
the strength of its economy. Employment and inflation, in turn, may drive
and/or be driven by the short-term interest rates set by the U.S. monetary
authorities. Eﬃcient financial markets would then react to news about them,
insofar as they provide information about the payoﬀs of the traded assets and
the rates at which to discount them. Therefore, the release of employment,
inflation, and interest rate news should ultimately aﬀect the behavior of
returns on both government and corporate securities. We proxy for these
releases by focusing on four real-time U.S. macroeconomic announcements:
Consumer Price Index, Nonfarm Payroll Employment, and Civilian Unem-
ployment news, exogenously released on a monthly basis, and Fed Funds
Target Rate decisions, instead potentially endogenous to the former.3
Based on the above considerations, we intend to address four basic sets
of questions in this study. First, what is the impact of these crucial macroe-
conomic news on asset returns and asset return volatility in the proximity
of their first release? Are the markets where these assets are traded more
volatile before the news event and less volatile afterward? This would be the
case, for example, if the arrival of information leads to resolution of uncer-
tainty among market participants. Or, is that arrival instead destabilizing,
e.g., when inducing greater uncertainty about the future economic environ-
ment?
Second, do the news releases aﬀect the markets for diﬀerent asset classes
in diﬀerent ways? The rationale for heterogeneity in the fluctuations of stock
1See the survey of Hirshleifer (2001) and references therein
2E.g., Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Kallberg and Pasquariello (2004), Pasquariello
(2004), Yuan (2005), and references therein.
3Among the various measures of inflation, the CPI is considered its best proxy and is
the number usually followed by the Federal Reserve. Statistics about the unemployment
rate and nonfarm payroll are included in the same news release on the same day. We use
both statistics in our study, since they are less than perfectly negatively correlated and
the former is highly predictable while the latter is not. Many earlier studies (e.g., Jones
et al., 1998) focus exclusively on the employment news data.
2
and (government and corporate) bond returns in response to macroeconomic
news is intuitive. For instance, higher inflation may increase only the volatil-
ity of the bond market, since stocks (and, to a lesser extent, corporate bonds)
oﬀer a natural hedge against inflation.
Third, do these macroeconomic announcements aﬀect the existing de-
gree of correlation between diﬀerent asset classes? Indeed, correlation shifts
could stem from more intense portfolio rebalancing activity across stocks and
bonds (e.g., Fleming et al., 1998; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002) or from greater
dispersion of beliefs among speculators (as in Pasquariello, 2004) before and
after their arrivals.
Fourth, are these financial markets eﬃcient? In other words, is the impact
of these news releases driven exclusively by their unexpected component or
are they reacting even to anticipated information? Is the adjustment instan-
taneous or protracted over time? Is the increase in volatility and comovement
persistent?
To tackle these questions, we combine a database of daily excess holding-
period returns on seven portfolios of stocks traded on the NYSE-AMEX and
NASDAQ, of five, ten, and thirty-year Treasury bonds, and of Aaa and Baa-
rated long-term corporate bonds with data on those four macroeconomic
announcements and their consensus expectations between 1986 and 2002.
The expectation data, from the International Money Markets Services sur-
vey and from futures prices, are customarily assumed to represent unbiased
estimates of the anticipated portion of these announcements.4 Hence, they
allow us to identify the true news component in those information arrivals,
i.e., to remove the component of this information which, in eﬃcient markets,
should have already been incorporated into asset prices before being released
to the public. We then estimate the impact of these events on conditional
returns, return volatility, and return covariance using several extensions of
the GARCH(1,1)-DCC IMAmodel of Engle (2002). This specification, albeit
more flexible and parsimonious than most available multivariate models, has
been shown to perform equally well in a variety of situations.
The objective of our study is to contribute to the empirical literature
relating macroeconomic fundamentals to asset pricing dynamics. The devel-
opment of asset pricing models including macroeconomic risk factors dates
back to the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) of Merton
(1973), but it was the empirical analysis of Chen et al. (1986) that inspired
further investigations of the eﬀect of macroeconomic variables on asset re-
turns. Chen et al. (1986) argued that surprise shocks to macroeconomic
4The main properties of these datasets, as well as references to their use in the literature,
are provided in Section 4.
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factors (such as inflation and industrial production) should aﬀect the dis-
count rate and the expected cash flows of individual firms and, in turn, their
stock returns. Yet, their econometric approach yielded only mixed results.
Consequently, many of the ensuing studies concentrated explicitly on the
impact of various macroeconomic news announcements on asset prices.
These studies diﬀer on multiple grounds: Their choice of news, their
choice of market (bonds, stocks, or currencies), the moments of the return
distribution they examine, and the statistical methodology they employ. To
cite few examples among the most recent of them (to conserve space), Bal-
duzzi et al. (2001) and Andersen et al. (2004) include all available macro
announcements, while Jones et al. (1998), Bomfim and Reinhart (2000), Kut-
tner (2001), Bomfim (2003), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) limit their
analyses to distinct subsets of them, either by choice or because of data avail-
ability. Jones et al. (1998), Balduzzi et al. (2001), and Pasquariello and Vega
(2004) analyze the impact of macroeconomic news on the U.S. Treasury spot
market; Li and Engle (1998) and Kuttner (2001) examine the reaction of U.S.
Treasury and Fed Funds futures to their release; Connolly and Wang (2000),
Bomfim (2003), Boyd et al. (2004), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) con-
centrate on the stock markets, either U.S. or foreign. Fewer studies focus on
the simultaneous impact of macroeconomic news releases on both stocks and
government bonds (e.g., Bomfim and Reinhart, 2000) or their futures (An-
dersen et al., 2004), and none on the corporate bond market. Some of these
studies do not separate the expected component of the released information
from the unexpected one (e.g., Jones et al., 1998). Those that do estimate
the expected component either with futures contracts, whenever available
and relevant (e.g., Kuttner, 2001), with analysts’ surveys (e.g., Bomfim,
2003), or with statistical models (e.g., Boyd et al., 2004). Most of these
studies limit their empirical investigations to the first and second moments
of asset returns. Fleming et al. (1998) consider the volatility linkages of
stocks, bonds, and money market instruments, but do not specifically relate
the estimated volatility spillovers to macro news announcements. Connolly
and Wang (2000) and Andersen et al. (2004) examine the impact of these
news only on cross-country linkages, not cross-domestic market linkages, and
only among mean asset returns.
Our research diﬀers from the aforementioned literature (as well as from
other existing related studies not mentioned above) on several important
dimensions. First, we investigate the impact of the most relevant macroe-
conomic news (inflation, employment, and interest rates) on the joint dis-
tribution of the returns on the three most important U.S. financial markets:
Equity, Treasury bonds, and corporate bonds. This is arguably a reasonable
course of action, since each of these markets does not exist in a vacuum and
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investors can, and often do, hold and trade many of those securities at the
same time. Second, we use survey and futures data to extract the unexpected
components of these news announcements. Third, we analyze the impact of
their release on both the returns from the three sets of assets, as well as their
volatility and correlations. This eﬀort allows us to provide a more compre-
hensive picture of the eﬀect of macroeconomic information on the behavior of
asset prices in the U.S. capital markets, and to assess their relative eﬃciency.
We find that the process of price formation in the U.S. financial mar-
kets appears to be driven by fundamentals; yet, “excessive” volatility and
comovement also play an important role in return dynamics. Specifically,
our evidence reveals a statistically and economically significant dichotomy
between the reaction of the stock and bond markets to the release of unan-
ticipated fundamental information. After initially falling, conditional stock
return volatility increases the day these surprise macroeconomic news are
released. Conditional bond return volatility instead first rises and then de-
clines, the more so the shorter the maturity of the bond portfolio and the
greater its likelihood of default. However, we show that stock and bond re-
turns tend to react to the expected component of these announcements as
well. This evidence casts some doubts on the eﬃciency of the U.S. financial
markets with respect to widely anticipated and tracked releases of macroe-
conomic data. Finally, we find that conditional excess return comovement
within and across stock and bond markets generally decreases in correspon-
dence with those releases, even after controlling for volatility shifts. Overall,
these results often diﬀer from earlier studies where the surprise portion of
news releases could not be identified (e.g., Jones et al., 1998) and shed new
light on the mechanisms by which information is incorporated into prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses the
relevant economic and financial literature to identify a set of working hy-
potheses on the impact of news releases on stock and bond returns. Section
3 develops our econometric approach to estimating such impact. Section 4
describes our database. Section 5 summarizes the first set of results for con-
ditional returns, return volatility, and return comovement. Section 6 tests
for the diﬀerential eﬀect of positive and negative news on stock and bond re-
turn dynamics, while Section 7 explores the question of the eﬃciency of the
markets for stocks, government and corporate bonds. Section 8 concludes.
2 News and price discovery
In this paper, we study the short-term anticipation and response of the U.S.
stock, Treasury, and corporate bond markets to the arrival of relevant U.S.
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macroeconomic news. The goal of our multi-market analysis is to shed light
not only on the eﬀects of these news on mean excess returns and conditional
return volatility, but also on the comovement and interaction between those
markets in the proximity of their occurrence.
The analysis of Ross (1989) motivates the study of the relation between
information flow and volatility. Ross argued that, in an arbitrage-free econ-
omy, the volatility of prices should be related to the arrival of information
to an eﬃcient market. Pasquariello and Vega (2004) also showed that, ce-
teris paribus, the availability of a public signal increases unconditional price
volatility. This close relation can nonetheless manifest itself in diﬀerent ways
depending on the degree of uncertainty surrounding the announcement and
the degree of disagreement among investors regarding its content.
Intuitively, employment, inflation, and interest rate news may have a
direct or indirect impact on the beliefs of market participants about the
final payoﬀs of stocks and (government and corporate) bonds. Fed Funds
short-term rate decisions and employment and inflation shocks could in fact
aﬀect the discount rate for future cash flows as well as their magnitude and
likelihood.5 Yet, regardless of the prevailing directional eﬀect on beliefs and
prices, the release of this information may influence investors’ uncertainty
about future realizations of the macroeconomic variables, hence about assets’
future payoﬀs. As often argued (e.g., Veronesi, 1999 and references therein),
current return volatility is the best proxy for such uncertainty. The arrival
of any economically relevant announcement may then either increase this
volatility or reduce it.
Consistently, the existing literature on equity and Treasury bond markets
(e.g., Jones et al., 1998; Li and Engle, 1998; Bomfim, 2003) suggests two
distinct possibilities. The “calm before the storm” hypothesis states that,
on the days prior to important news announcements, financial markets are
usually tranquil, their prices having already reflected those news’ expected
content and uncertainty. However, the subsequent release of unexpected
macroeconomic information may have a destabilizing eﬀect on asset returns
and return volatility. For example, this would be the case if news arrival leads
to greater uncertainty and disagreement among market participants about
its implications for current asset valuations, potential policy moves, or the
state of the economy. We translate this argument in the following conjecture:
C (1) : Conditional return volatility is lower in the days immediately preced-
ing, and higher on the day of the arrival of both positive and negative
macroeconomic surprises.
5The eﬀects of diﬀerent macroeconomic news on the levels of asset returns is discussed
in greater detail below, in correspondence with the null hypothesis H0 (6).
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Alternatively, macroeconomic announcements may resolve previously high
uncertainty or attenuate pervasive diﬀerences in private information among
traders about assets’ payoﬀs. For instance, Pasquariello (2004) showed that,
ceteris paribus, more asymmetric sharing of private information among in-
siders increases equilibrium price volatility and comovement. Hence, sur-
prise macroeconomic news may lessen the degree of confusion or information
heterogeneity among market participants, thus reducing conditional return
volatility. We summarize this “storm before the calm” argument in the fol-
lowing conjecture:
C (2) : Conditional return volatility is higher in the days immediately pre-
ceding, and lower on the day of the arrival of both positive and negative
macroeconomic surprises.
The pattern of conditional return volatility following the release of news
about inflation and employment is also of interest to this study. Specifically,
we are interested in whether the volatility shocks described above are of a
transitory or persistent nature. Jones et al. (1998) observe that clustering
of information arrivals, market sentiment, or gradual learning considerations
may all justify why an increase in conditional volatility would persist over
time. Further, the timing of these macroeconomic releases is not clustered
and exogenous to financial markets.6 Therefore, lack of persistence in an-
nouncement shocks would suggest that additional information gathering or
the trading process do not intrinsically increase return volatility. Some sup-
porting evidence is provided by Jones et al. (1998) for the U.S. Treasury
market using actual (rather than unexpected) labor and producer price an-
nouncements.
C (3) : Conditional return volatility is lower in the days immediately follow-
ing the arrival of both positive and negative exogenous macroeconomic
surprises.
Although the schedule for the release of CPI, payroll, and unemploy-
ment is exogenous to the U.S. financial markets, both the timing and the
content of the target rate decisions by the Federal Reserve are possibly en-
dogenous. Indeed, the sequence of publicly observable events (including the
above macroeconomic announcements) and the nature of policy-making by
a monetary authority may make the resulting news-generating process for
6Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that no other news released immediately fol-
lowing target rate, CPI, payroll, and unemployment information is important enough to
systematically induce additionally intensifying or oﬀsetting volatility shocks.
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target rate decisions autocorrelated, hence autocorrelated volatility consis-
tent with market eﬃciency.7 This eﬀect may in turn enhance, attenuate, or
even dominate those reported in C (1) to C (3), thus leading to the following
conjecture:
C (4) : The behavior of conditional return volatility around the dates of sur-
prise Fed decisions diﬀers from what is postulated in C (1) to C (3).
As the quote in Section 1 suggests, the financial press frequently em-
phasizes the greater degree of comovement among financial markets in the
proximity of the release of macroeconomic news. There are several reasons
why this may occur. First, asset prices move together when those news
announcements simultaneously aﬀect expectations in more than one market.
This is what Fleming et al. (1998) call the “common information” argument.
Second, the release of unexpected macroeconomic information may trigger
rebalancing activity across asset classes due to portfolio considerations.8 Sim-
ilarly, investors may react to an uncertain macroeconomic environment by
“flying to quality” (i.e., to government notes and bonds) and away from
riskier corporate securities. Alternatively, comovement among asset prices
is deemed excessive when unjustified by the underlying fundamental links
among their payoﬀs.
The nature of linkages and information spillovers across markets has been
extensively scrutinized; in particular, a growing body of empirical evidence
suggests that excess return volatility and comovement are pervasive to most
capital markets during both tranquil and uncertain times.9 Many of the
explanations proposed for this phenomenon concentrate on the trading pro-
cess, i.e., on the trading activity of market participants, in the presence of
information asymmetry and heterogeneity, as well as of market imperfections
and frictions.10 The arrival of surprise news is likely to accentuate the rele-
vance of most of these arguments. For example, the release of macroeconomic
7Nonetheless, Jones et al. (1998) do not find any evidence that the Federal Reserve is
more likely to change the target rate on days immediately following Producer Price Index
(PPI), nonfarm payroll, and unemployment announcements.
8For instance, the announcement of an unexpected increase in CPI, in an economy
just emerging from a recession, may induce investors to shift their holdings from bonds
to stocks, since the latter are generally deemed to provide a better hedge against future
inflation.
9A list of recent contributions includes Shiller (1989), King and Wadhwani (1990),
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990, 1993), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Connolly and Wang
(2000), Barberis et al. (2002), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and Kallberg and Pasquariello
(2004).
10Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Kallberg and Pasquariello (2004) review the state of the
theoretical literature on excess comovement.
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information may reduce the extent of information asymmetry and/or hetero-
geneity among market participants (hence decreasing excess comovement),
induce investors to revise their speculative positions, or make some financial
constraints more binding for them (instead increasing excess comovement).
Measurement issues are the object of considerable debate as well, since Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) argued that shifts to conditional correlation may be un-
related to a spillover eﬀect in the presence of greater conditional volatility.
Therefore, we argue here that evidence of shocks to conditional covariance
induced by surprise macroeconomic news, after controlling for their impact
on mean returns and conditional volatility, provides support to the notion of
excess comovement among U.S. financial markets. We formalize this conjec-
ture as follows:
C (5) : Surprise macroeconomic news announcements may have an excessive
impact on conditional return covariances in the proximity of their re-
lease.
We also focus our attention on the levels of asset returns. Much empirical
and theoretical literature has explored the reaction of stock and bond prices
to macroeconomic announcements.11 As mentioned earlier, it is argued there
that the impact of news arrivals on asset prices occurs through any of the
following three factors: Expected cash flows from the assets, the appropriate
discount rates, and their risk premia. The impact on government bond prices
is the least controversial; for example, the Lucas’ (1982) general equilibrium
model in Andersen et al. (2004) shows that surprise positive inflation or real
activity shocks should increase risk-free bond yields. The available empir-
ical evidence supports this argument (e.g., Balduzzi et al., 2001). Ensuing
increased macroeconomic risk may also play a role. French et al. (1987) sug-
gest that greater price volatility is usually accompanied by higher expected
returns. Consistently, Jones et al. (1998) find that, when accompanied by
greater conditional volatility, actual PPI and employment announcements
also induce higher expected returns.
Chen et al. (1986) were the first to explicitly identify an empirical link
between several macroeconomic variables and expected stock returns in the
context of a multi-factor cross-sectional asset pricing model. Assessing the
impact of news arrivals on stocks and corporate bonds is more ambiguous,
since their prices do not depend solely on future interest rates. A positive
macroeconomic shock (e.g., unemployment decline) may increase a corpora-
tion’s expected rate of growth of dividends and decrease the likelihood of
11See Andersen et al. (2004) for a survey of the most recent contributions.
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default on its debt, thus increasing its stock and corporate bond prices, ce-
teris paribus for their risk premia. Yet, the same shock may also increase the
rates at which the future cash flows from these assets are discounted. Recent
research (e.g., Andersen et al., 2004; Boyd et al., 2004) further shows that
the resulting net impact on stock prices may be state-dependent, i.e., that
the dominance of the former eﬀect over the latter (or vice versa) is driven by
the aggregate health of the economy. One of the objectives of this paper is to
identify the relative strength of these eﬀects for the broadest range of asset
classes in the U.S. financial market, including the corporate bond market.
We therefore assess the relevance of the following conjecture:
C (6) : The contemporaneous impact of positive (negative) macroeconomic
surprises is positive (negative) on bond returns, and ambiguous on stock
and corporate bond returns.
Finally, we intend to analyze the impact of expected announcements on
the U.S. financial markets. All of the above arguments assume in fact that
the news arrivals have some information content for market participants.
If they have not, market eﬃciency implies that the reaction of conditional
returns, volatility, and covariances to their releases should be insignificant.
Yet, any evidence of the contrary would be supportive of the role played by
the trading process, or by market sentiment in generating excess volatility
and comovement among asset returns. This is captured by the following
conjecture:
C (7) : Anticipated macroeconomic announcements should have no impact
on stock, government, and corporate bond returns, return volatility,
and their interaction.
3 The empirical model
The main objective of this study is to analyze the short-term behavior of
the U.S. financial market in proximity of the release of macroeconomic news.
In this section, we describe the empirical methodology we use for that pur-
pose. The GARCH specification proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and its many
univariate and multivariate extensions are among the most widely adopted
models to describe time-varying volatility and covariances.12 Their success
12An albeit incomplete list of univariate models includes the IGARCH model of Engle
and Bollerslev (1986), the ARCH-M regression of Engle et al. (1987), and the EGARCH
model of Nelson (1991); popular multivariate extensions are the VECH model of Bollerslev
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can be attributed to the ability to provide robust descriptions of many volatil-
ity processes (see Nelson, 1990; Nelson and Foster, 1994). Moreover, a large
body of literature now exists on the theoretical properties of their estima-
tors.13 Yet, in most cases, multivariate GARCH models are not flexible
enough, and the number of parameters in them too big, to introduce com-
plex forms of conditional comovement among asset returns. In this paper,
we use the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model introduced by
Engle (2002). Indeed, the DCC specification has the flexibility of univariate
GARCH models without the complexity of traditional multivariate GARCH
specifications. We start by proposing the following GARCH(1,1) model to
describe the evolution of daily excess asset returns ri:
rit = µ
e
i + ρ
e
ir
i
t−1 + γ
e
i (0) I
e
t (0) + ε
i
t
εit =
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i
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According to Engle (1995, p. xii), the GARCH(1,1) is “the leading generic
model for almost all asset classes of returns.” In Eq. (1), Iet (k) is an event
dummy equal to 1 if a surprise macroeconomic event of type e occurred at
time t + k and equal to zero otherwise. We can interpret the corresponding
dummy coeﬃcients in the expression for hit in Eq. (1) as proxies for the
(sequential) impact of news arrivals on conditional excess return variance.
Hence, δei (1) is a measure of anticipation, i.e., of the marginal percentage
impact of the release of macroeconomic information on the conditional vari-
ance of the excess return ri before that release actually occurs at time t+ 1.
The coeﬃcient δei (0) is a proxy for the additional, contemporaneous marginal
percentage impact of the news release on hit. Finally, the coeﬃcient δ
e
i (−1)
is a measure of persistence, i.e., of the additional marginal percentage impact
of the news arrival on hit after the information has already been revealed at
time t − 1.14 As standard in the finance literature, Eq. (1) specifies a first-
order autocorrelation model for excess holding-period returns, to control for
et al. (1988), the CCORR model of Bollerslev (1990), and the BEKK model of Engle and
Kroner (1995). For more on the properties of these specifications, see Kroner and Ng
(1998).
13See Lumsdaine (1996) for a review.
14An alternative specification has been used in the literature (e.g., Jones et al., 1998;
Bomfim, 2003): It assumes instead that εit =
p
situ
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. In this case, the dummy coeﬃcients measure the
average marginal impact of news arrivals, for example [1 + δi (0)]hit, with respect to the
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nonsynchronicity in prices, microstructure eﬀects, and gradual convergence
to equilibrium, as in Jones et al. (1998). We further account for the pos-
sibility that surprise macroeconomic news aﬀect the first moment of asset
returns (e.g., Boyd et al., 2004), in addition to the conditional variance hit,
by including the dummy Iet (0) in the process for r
i; hence, the coeﬃcient
γei (0) measures the impact of the macroeconomic event e on the mean excess
return on the announcement dates.
We also intend to study the impact of news arrivals on the structure of
conditional correlation among asset classes. There is a growing body of litera-
ture investigating the extent of information spillover from amarket to another
(e.g., Fleming et al., 1998; Kallberg et al., 2005 and references therein) and
the extent to which it may be deemed excessive (e.g., King and Wadhwani,
1990; Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990, 1993; Kallberg and Pasquariello, 2004).
Yet, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) showed that the increase in conditional cor-
relation among asset returns in proximity of certain macroeconomic events
may be due to an increase in return volatility, i.e., to heteroskedasticity. We
tackle this problem by assuming that the conditional covariance between any
two standardized residuals eit and e
j
t at time t, given all the information avail-
able at time t − 1, qijt , is described accurately by the following exponential
smoother:
qijt =
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
dei (k) I
e
t (k)
# £
λeqijt−1 + (1− λe) eit−1ejt−1
¤
. (2)
We add eite
j
t to both sides of Eq. (2) to obtain an integrated moving average
(IMA) process with no intercept,
eite
j
t − eit−1ejt−1 =
"
+1X
k=−1
dei (k) I
e
t (k)
#
eit−1e
j
t−1 +
¡
qijt − eitejt
¢
+ (3)
−λe
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
dei (k) I
e
t (k)
# ¡
qijt−1 − eit−1ejt−1
¢
,
conditional variance of rit in nonannouncement days (e.g., var
£
uit|zt−1
¤
= hit), while
[1 + δi (0)]hit in Eq. (1) measures the additional average marginal impact of the news
release with respect to var
£
εit|zt−1, It−1 (1) = 1
¤
, i.e., with respect to the conditional
variance based on an augmented filtration. We prefer the model of Eq.(1) for ease of
interpretation. Indeed, assume that if no announcement occurred at date t then hit−1 =
hit = h
i
t+1 = 10% but that if an announcement occurs at time t, then on average h
i
t−1 =
10%, hit = 25%, and h
i
t+1 = 12.5%, i.e., a contemporaneous increase and then a decrease
in conditional variance take place. In this case, we should expect dummy coeﬃcients’
estimates of Eq.(1) to be δi (1) = 0, δi (0) > 0, and δi (−1) < 0, while the output of the
model described above would be δi (1) = 0, δi (0) > 0, and 0 < δi (−1) < δi (0).
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where the errors qijt − eitejt , with a conditional mean of zero, are Martingale
diﬀerences by construction and can be thought of as white-noise sequences.
Eq. (3) is an extension of the DCC IMAmodel of Engle (2002) with common
cross-asset adjustments (λe). More importantly, we use the above model in
this paper to measure the anticipated (dei (1)), contemporaneous (d
e
i (0)), and
persistent (dei (−1)) eﬀect of the arrival of news on conditional correlations
in a parsimonious way, while controlling for the impact of these arrivals on
conditional volatility and mean excess returns, as advocated by Forbes and
Rigobon (2002). Indeed, any common fundamental information shock stem-
ming from the news arrival at time t aﬀects directly the processes for rit and
hit in Eq. (1), via the parameters γ
e
i (0), δ
e
i (−1), δei (0), and δei (1). Therefore,
we deem the impact of these arrivals on the comovement between any pair of
standardized residuals eit and e
j
t (the ensuing unpredictable portions of the
fluctuations in asset prices), measured by the parameters dei (1), d
e
i (0), and
dei (−1), as “excessive.”
As first suggested by Engle (2002), the model of Eqs. (1) and (3) is es-
timated in two steps. In the first step, Eq. (1) is estimated separately for
each asset i by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) procedure described in
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Hence, the resulting estimates are consis-
tent and asymptotically eﬃcient. In the second step, the parametric model
of Eq. (3) is estimated again by quasi-maximum likelihood, using the pa-
rameters obtained in the first step. Under some mild regularity conditions,
consistency of those estimates ensures consistency of the estimates stemming
from the second step. Engle (2002) showed that these estimates perform well
in a variety of situations and provide reasonable empirical results.
4 Data
The basic dataset we use in this paper consists of a variety of daily, continu-
ously compounded excess holding-period returns (over three-month Treasury
bills) on three asset classes – stocks, Treasury bonds, and corporate bonds–
whose prices are expected to be aﬀected by four macroeconomic announce-
ments: the Target Fed Funds rates, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the
Unemployment Rate, and the Nonfarm Payroll Employment. Excess stock
holding-period returns (including distributions) are computed for the CRSP
value-weighted portfolios made of NYSE and AMEX stocks (rnyxt ) and of
NASDAQ stocks (rnaqt ). We calculate holding-period returns on Treasury
bonds using the constant-maturity five-year, ten-year, and thirty-year time
series of interest rates, constructed by the U.S. Treasury from yields on ac-
tively traded issues. These rates are converted into excess five-year (r5yt ),
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ten-year (r10yt ), and thirty-year (r
30y
t ) holding-period returns on hypotheti-
cal par bonds with the corresponding maturity, as in Jones et al. (1998).
A similar procedure is employed to compute excess holding-period returns
for two portfolios of corporate bonds, one made of Aaa-rated (raaat ) and the
other made of Baa-rated (rbaat ) U.S. corporate bonds, with maturity equal to
or greater than twenty years, from Moody’s Investors Service.15 Aaa-rated
bonds carry the smallest degree of investment risk. Baa-rated bonds are
neither highly protected nor poorly secured, and are generally deemed to
have some speculative characteristics. Our sample covers a period of roughly
16 years, from January 3, 1986 (the first day for which daily Baa portfo-
lio yields become available) to February 14, 2002 (the last day for which
constant-maturity thirty-year Treasury bond yields are available).
Summary statistics for these series are reported in Table 1. Returns are
in percentage, i.e., were multiplied by 100. Not surprisingly, given the growth
experienced by the U.S. stock market in the past three decades, the mean
excess returns rnyxt and r
naq
t are positive, significant, and the highest among
the asset classes under examination. Excess bond returns are positive as
well, and increasing with maturity and likelihood of default. Daily excess
returns are also characterized by little or no skewness, strong and significant
leptokurtosis, and small positive autocorrelation (bρ1 > 0). Finally, the Ljung-
Box portmanteau test for up to the fifth-order serial correlation, LB (5),
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that excess holding-period returns on
stocks, Treasury, highest-grade (Aaa), and medium-grade (Baa) securities
are white noise.
We assemble a database of significant macroeconomic announcements
over our sample interval. We collect information on all meetings of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Bloomberg. In particular, we
focus on target Fed Funds rate decisions, which represent the most explicit
public disclosure by the Federal Reserve of its stance of monetary policy over
the sample period. By law, the FOMC must meet at least 4 times a year, but
it has held a minimum of 8 scheduled meetings per year since 1981. Nonethe-
less, Bomfim and Reinhart (2000) observe that more than 75% of changes in
the intended Fed Funds rate from 1989 to 1993 occurred between those meet-
ings. Furthermore, until the end of 1993, the Federal Reserve took the vast
majority of its interest rate decisions in the afternoon, when the Fed Funds
market in New York was virtually closed, and declared them by conducting
open-market operations the next day. However, since March 28, 1994, the
Fed Funds rate has been released regularly at 2:15 p.m. Eastern Standard
15For these two portfolios, we assume that the hypothetical par corporate bonds have a
maturity of 20 years.
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Time (EST). We control for this delay by shifting the “eﬀective” Fed Funds
announcement date by one day until then.16
Real-time data (i.e., as reported in the original press releases) and dates
on CPI, Nonfarm Payroll, and Unemployment monthly announcements are
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The monthly news releases con-
taining CPI data (cpiτ , in percentage in Table 2) are usually made available
to the public at 8:30 a.m. EST of any day of the second full week of the
month following the Tuesday of the week containing the 13th of the previ-
ous month. News releases of monthly changes in nonfarm payroll (payτ , in
thousands in Table 2) and unemployment (uneτ , in percentage in Table 2)
instead come (again at 8:30 a.m. EST) about three weeks after the calendar
week (Sunday through Saturday) which includes the 12th day of the previous
month.
We classify these economic announcements according to their sign and
to whether their content was anticipated by the market. For that purpose,
we use the database of forecasts compiled by International Money Market
Services (MMS). Over the past two decades, MMS has surveyed dozens of
economists and money managers, collecting their forecasts for a broad range
of macroeconomic variables.17 Consistent with the existing literature on
macroeconomic news arrivals (e.g., Balduzzi et al., 2001; Andersen et al.,
2003, 2004), we define each announcement a surprise if its absolute diﬀerence
with respect to the “market consensus,” the corresponding median forecast,
is big, i.e., greater than some predetermined threshold.18 We use a similar ap-
proach for the target rate decisions by the Federal Reserve. Nonetheless, we
measure the corresponding market expectations using the thirty-day interest
rate futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), since
changes in the Fed funds futures rate, an intuitive aggregation of market-wide
policy expectations, have been shown to represent more eﬃcient predictors
of FOMC’s target rate changes.19 We employ the algorithm devised by Kut-
16For more on the timing discrepancy between FOMC announcements and the end of
trading in the Fed Funds market, see Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).
17MMS surveys are conducted via telephone every last Friday prior to each news an-
nouncement, and the resulting median forecasts are released during the following week.
According to several studies of their information content (e.g., Urich and Wachtel, 1984;
Balduzzi et al., 2001), MMS expectations are generally unbiased and less noisy estimates
of the corresponding realized macroeconomic variables than those generated by extrapola-
tive models (e.g., Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981). For a more detailed description of the
MMS database and its properties, see Andersen et al. (2003, 2004).
18More specifically, we use a threshold of 5 basis points for fedτ , cpiτ , and uneτ , and of
20, 000 jobs for payτ . The results that follow were not meaningfully aﬀected by alternative
thresholds.
19Krueger and Kuttner (1996), Bomfim and Reinhart (2000), and Kuttner (2001) ex-
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tner (2000) to estimate the one-day rate surprise from the one-day change
in the spot-month futures rate around FOMC announcements. Yet, because
CBOT futures prices are available only from October 3, 1988, we use MMS
forecasts for the first three years of the sample.
According to Table 2, there were 165 FOMC meetings over our sample
period. The Federal Reserve decided much less frequently to increase the Fed
Funds rate (fedτ , in percentage in Table 2) than to either leave it unchanged
or cut it. About 43% of all rate decisions (and 59% of rate increases) were
unexpected by the market. The CPI series suggests an annual inflation rate
of 3% between 1986 and 2002. Not surprisingly, given the behavior of the
U.S. economy over the last two decades, CPI deflation was much less common
(cpit ≤ 0 only 20 times), and went almost always undetected by the market.
Recessions were of shorter length (uneτ > 0 in 67, and payτ ≤ 0 in 40, of
194 BLS press releases) and generally exhibited greater per month intensity
than expansions, but both were equally diﬃcult to predict on average.
5 The basic results
We start our analysis by estimating the model of Eqs. (1) and (3), first
over our entire sample of macroeconomic announcements and then for each
of them separately, according to the procedure described in Section 3. More
specifically, Panel A of Tables 3 and 4 report QML estimates (and robust
t-statistics) of selected parameters of Eqs. (1) and (3), respectively, when we
replace Iet (k) with dummy variables It (k) equal to 1 if any of the surprise
economic events described in Table 1 took place at time t+k (either Ifedt (k) =
1, Icpit (k) = 1, I
une
t (k) = 1, or I
pay
t (k) = 1), and zero otherwise. Panel B
of Tables 3 and 4 instead report the same QML estimates for each surprise
announcement.20
Tables 3 and 4 reveal a significant dichotomy between the reaction of the
U.S. stock and bond markets to economic news. Indeed, conditional stock
return volatility is somewhat lower the day before (δi (1) < 0), and signif-
icantly higher the day of their arrival (88% higher for the NYSE-AMEX
and 31% higher for the NASDAQ), consistent with the “calm before the
plored the properties of various proxies for market expectations of FOMC rate changes
implied by Fed funds future rates. Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) find that forecasts from
one-day changes in Fed funds futures rates are the least aﬀected by biases induced by
time-varying risk premia.
20The empirical specification of Eqs. (1) and (3) can be easily amended to control
for day-of-the-week eﬀects (e.g., Jones et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the
inclusion of day-of-the-week dummies did not significantly aﬀect our inference, either qual-
itatively or quantitatively.
16
storm” conjecture described in Section 2 (C (1)). In contrast, we find that
the coeﬃcients δi (1) are significantly positive for conditional government
and corporate bond return volatility. In particular, the day before the re-
lease of macroeconomic news, excess holding-period return volatility actually
increases by a minimum of 63% for Aaa-rated long-term corporate bonds to
a maximum of 153% for five-year Treasury bonds. This suggests that there
is considerable increase in uncertainty among bond market participants in
anticipation of the release of macroeconomic news. This “storm before the
calm” eﬀect is only partially short-lived, since the contemporaneous coef-
ficients δi (0), albeit significantly negative (at the 1% level), are of much
lower magnitude (e.g., δi (0) = −0.561 for five-year Treasury bonds), while
δi (−1) is either small, negative, and weakly significant, or zero. Stock re-
turn volatility in the NYSE-AMEX instead declines appreciably after the
announcements (δi (−1) = −0.246 in Table 3), as stated in C (3). The above
evidence diﬀers from earlier results by Jones et al. (1998) on a similar set of
actual (rather than unexpected) announcements but is compatible with the
arguments summarized in C (2): In the U.S. bond market, any additional in-
formation stemming from economic news does not appear to augment bond
price fluctuations, i.e., these news appear to induce (at least partial) resolu-
tion of uncertainty and/or disagreement among bond market participants.
Further insight comes from the analysis of the separate impact of each
macroeconomic announcement on conditional return volatility, reported in
Panel B of Table 3. As expected (and articulated in C (4)), the reaction of
both stock and bond markets to the target rate decisions by the Federal Re-
serve is generally diﬀerent from what we found for any other event. Indeed,
the reaction of these markets close to when the Fed announces its target rate
is both less economically and statistically significant. For example, when
significant, the estimated positive shocks to the conditional return volatility
of corporate securities around these announcements are less persistent than
across all events (i.e., the absolute estimates for δfedi (−1) are larger than
those for δi (−1) in Panel A of Table 3). The arrival of employment news has
the greatest impact on the government bond market, especially before their
release, while CPI news has the lowest; the corresponding eﬀect on corporate
bonds, although of same sign, is of somewhat smaller scale. Interestingly,
nonfarm payroll surprises, although released simultaneously with unemploy-
ment numbers, are preceded and accompanied by relatively more pronounced
volatility shocks. This evidence is consistent with some recent studies (e.g.,
Andersen et al., 2004; Pasquariello and Vega, 2004) suggesting that nonfarm
payroll has the greatest information content among all public signals of the
state of the U.S. economy available to investors and speculators. The milder
reaction of both government and corporate bonds to CPI surprises may in-
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stead stem from the relative stability of inflation expectations and the Fed’s
significant credibility in fighting inflation over our sample period 1986-2002.
The absolute magnitude of δi (1) and δi (0) is decreasing in the maturity of
the bond portfolios and increasing in the likelihood of default, as proxied by
the Moody’s ratings. Greater sensitivity of corporate bonds of poorer quality
to the business cycle (e.g., Gertler and Lown, 2000) may explain the latter.
The notion that five-year Treasury bonds are the most liquid (e.g., Brandt
and Kavajecz, 2004; Goldreich et al., 2005) may instead explain the former,
since we would expect the intensity of information gathering and portfolio
rebalancing induced by the news arrivals to be greater for more liquid se-
curities.21 Alternatively, mean reversion in short-term interest rates (e.g.,
Chapman and Pearson, 2000 and references therein) may lead to a weaker
impact of an information shock on longer-term bonds, since any impact of
such shocks on the short end of the yield curve is expected to die out for its
long end.
At this preliminary stage of our analysis, we find strong evidence of a pos-
itive relation between the risk premium of each of the asset classes we study
and the risk to which they are exposed on days when surprise macroeconomic
events take place. More specifically, Panel A of Table 3 shows that mean ex-
cess holding-period returns are higher for stocks and lower for bonds during
macroeconomic announcements, and that the corresponding estimated coeﬃ-
cient γi (0) is of the same sign as the estimated contemporaneous coeﬃcients
δi (0) in Eq. (1) for conditional return volatility. These results diﬀer from
those of Jones et al. (1998), since their analysis of actual (rather than unex-
pected) macroeconomic releases suggested that bonds earn higher (and not
lower) returns in response to their arrival. Hence, the identification of sur-
prise announcements is critical to the understanding of their impact on the
first (and second) moment of stock and bond holding-period returns. The
observed decline in bond risk premia is increasing in their maturity (hence
decreasing in their liquidity) and (weakly) in the quality of the issuers. The
eﬀect on stock risk premia disappears when each event is considered sep-
arately. The risk premium for bond returns is instead (economically and
statistically) significant only in correspondence with payroll announcements
(at the five-year and ten-year Treasury maturity) and CPI news releases (for
thirty-year government and corporate bonds), in Panel B of Table 3.
As discussed earlier, within each asset class, the stock markets display
the greatest heterogeneity of responses to surprise macroeconomic announce-
21E.g., Chowdhry and Nanda (1991). Yet, shorter-maturity bonds are also less sensitive
to fluctuations of interest and inflation rate expectations potentially induced by those news.
According to Panel B in Table 3, this eﬀect is weaker than the maturity (or liquidity) eﬀect.
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ments (CPI, payroll, and unemployment). Indeed, the impact of their arrival
on NASDAQ conditional return and volatility is often economic and/or sta-
tistically insignificant. This is not surprising, since most “new economy”
companies, whose expected growth rate and equity risk premia are deemed
less sensitive to labor or inflation news than to the state of their specific
industry, are traded there. Consistently, the decoupling with the NYSE-
AMEX is not complete, for the estimated eﬀect of target rate decisions by
the Federal Reserve is instead similar in sign and magnitude to that on Big
Board and AMEX stocks (δfedi (0) = 0.681 and 0.729 for i = r
nyx
t and r
naq
t ,
respectively). Further, target rate decisions have a significant impact only
on the most liquid bonds in our sample, the five-year Treasury securities,
while the estimated coeﬃcients from Eq. (1) in response to CPI and labor
data releases are more homogeneous across government and corporate bonds
(e.g., δpayi (0) ranging from −0.484 to −0.753 in Panel B of Table 3).
We find an even greater dichotomy between the stock and the bond mar-
kets when we estimate the DCC IMA covariance model of Eq. (3). The
coeﬃcients reported in Panels A and B of Table 4 suggest that the release of
our sample of economic announcements is preceded by sharply lower comove-
ment among U.S. stock markets on the previous day (di (1) = −0.786). This
decline is only partially reversed on the day of news arrivals and soon after-
ward (di (0) = 0.301 and di (−1) = 0.164), even after controlling for their
impact on conditional stock return and return volatility. While the drop
in the comovement between NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ excess returns is
relatively homogeneous in intensity and significance, the ensuing contempo-
raneous increase is concentrated in correspondence with CPI surprises, with
a magnitude of about 120% from pre-announcement levels. The decline in
covariance among government bond returns around the release of those news
is of more diﬀuse intensity (di (1) = −0.387 and di (0) = −0.712 in Panel A of
Table 4) but similar persistence, since it is not fully reabsorbed the trading
day afterward (di (−1) = 1.002). Excess returns on Moody’s portfolios of
Aaa and Baa-rated corporate bonds weakly decuple on announcement days
(di (0) = −0.196), and more strongly so afterward (di (−1) = −0.506).
Finally, contrary to the conjecture summarized by C (5), comovement
among all asset classes actually decreases in the proximity of all macroe-
conomic news releases (see Panel B of Table 4).22 For example, we find
that comovement between stock and government bonds, stocks and corpo-
rate bonds, and government and corporate bonds declines on average by
22We also estimated the model of Eq. (3) separately for each of the covariance pairs
i and j when allowing for specific cross-asset adjustment parameters λeij . The results,
available on request from the authors, were similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
to those reported in Table 4.
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95%, 97%, and 60%, respectively, on the announcement dates. Hence, any
portfolio rebalancing induced by those news or shifts to the degree of in-
formation asymmetry and heterogeneity among traders translates into either
more negative or less positive (but not more positive) comovement among the
excess holding-period returns in our sample. Indeed, this evidence suggests
that most of the macroeconomic announcements in our sample have a greater
(and possibly more heterogeneous) impact on assets’ expected cash flows and
risk premia than on the rates at which future cash flows are discounted, thus
inducing lower covariance among their returns.
6 Asymmetric news impact
In the previous section, we showed that the arrival of macroeconomic news
aﬀected significantly the U.S. equity and bond markets between 1986 and
2002. The sign and magnitude of the impact of their release on the dynamics
of asset prices should also depend on their information content. Indeed, the
eﬀect of “good” or “bad” news on each of the three factors driving asset
prices, the risk-free rate of interest, the expected cash flows, and the risk
premium, is possibly asymmetric.23 For example, Boyd et al. (2004) found
that, in the short run, the reaction of stock and bond prices to unemployment
news, measured with respect to a statistical model for final release numbers,
is state-dependent. The equity market usually responds positively to sur-
prisingly rising unemployment, while Treasury bond prices react to it only
during expansions. Similarly, Veronesi (1999) argued that “good” or “bad”
news may increase uncertainty when released in “bad” or “good” times, re-
spectively.24 Furthermore, it is also possible that the various forms of market
frictions and financial constraints described in the literature (e.g., borrowing,
short-selling, and wealth constraints) are more binding on investors’ behav-
ior following “negative” announcements. These constraints could then aﬀect
not only the level of asset returns (e.g., Diether et al., 2002) but also their
volatility and comovement (Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Yuan, 2005) diﬀerentially
in proximity of news arrivals.
We explore those issues in this section by amending the model of Eqs. (1)
and (3) to allow for asymmetric eﬀects of news releases. More specifically, we
23In light of the earlier discussion, we use the terms “good” and “bad” to refer exclusively
to the content of the news, rather than to their implications for stock and bond valuations.
24Along these lines, Andersen et al. (2004) reported that, during the 1990s, intraday
stock, bond, and currency futures returns experienced heterogeneous conditional mean
and volatility jumps in presence of “good” or “bad” news.
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introduce the following GARCH(1,1) model for conditional return volatility
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where Iet (k,+) are dummy variables equal to 1 if the Federal Reserve an-
nounced a surprise rate increase on day t + k (e = fed), or if the CPI
(e = cpi) or the unemployment rate (e = une) was reported at day t + k
to have surprisingly increased with respect to the previous month, or if the
nonfarm payroll (e = pay) was reported on day t + k to have surprisingly
increased (or to have surprisingly remained unchanged) with respect to the
previous month, and zero otherwise; vice versa, Iet (k,−) are dummy vari-
ables equal to 1 if the Federal Reserve announced a surprise rate cut or if
rates were surprisingly unchanged on day t + k (e = fed), or if the CPI
(e = cpi) or the unemployment rate (e = une) was reported at day t+ k to
have surprisingly decreased (or stayed unchanged) with respect to the previ-
ous month, or if the nonfarm payroll (e = pay) was reported on day t+ k to
have surprisingly decreased with respect to the previous month, and zero oth-
erwise. Hence, Ifedt (k,+), I
cpi
t (k,+), I
une
t (k,+), and I
pay
t (k,−) are “bad”
news dummies, while Ifedt (k,−), Icpit (k,−), Iunet (k,−), and Ipayt (k,+) are
“good” news dummies.
We estimate the model of Eqs. (4) and (5) according to the QML pro-
cedure described in Section 3 and report the ensuing coeﬃcients in Table
5 for conditional returns and volatility and in Table 6 for return covari-
ances. Our results reveal a significant degree of asymmetry in the response
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of the U.S. financial markets to the arrival of macroeconomic news of pos-
itive versus negative information content. More specifically, Table 5 shows
that the absolute magnitude of the eﬀects of news releases on returns and
return volatility described in Section 5 is generally greater when the news are
bad (especially worse than expected employment news, i.e., Iunet (k,+), and
Ipayt (k,−)): Conditional stock (bond) return volatility rises more sharply the
day of (before), and drops more sharply the day after (of) their release. For
instance, we find that the conditional volatility of five-year Treasury bond
returns increases by 300% the day before, and then declines by 79% the day
of the release of “bad” unemployment news, versus an increase of 178% and
subsequent decline by 75% in correspondence with an unexpected decrease
in unemployment. CPI data represent the sole exception, since such di-
chotomous eﬀect of their arrival takes place only in the proximity of surprise
inflation. On the other hand, we cannot reject the “storm before the calm”
conjecture C (2) described in Section 2 for both corporate and government
securities, i.e., we find no evidence of decoupling between the dynamics of
conditional stock and bond return volatility in the proximity of unexpected
deflation news releases (Icpit (k,−)). Overall, this evidence suggests that neg-
ative macroeconomic news are more likely to induce greater uncertainty in
the U.S. stock and bond markets.
Yet, this uncertainty does not necessarily translate into greater risk pre-
mia. Indeed, when examining estimates for the contemporaneous impact
of target rate news on conditional excess returns (γei (0,+) and γ
e
i (0,−) in
Eq. (4)), we find that unexpected rate cuts by the Federal Reserve have
a positive, statistically and economically significant impact on mean excess
stock returns (an increase of 33 basis points for the NYSE-AMEX and 40
basis points for the NASDAQ), albeit being followed by lower conditional
volatility the next business day. Interestingly, inflation (deflation) surprises,
which generally accompany a growing (slowing) economy and may lead to fu-
ture target rate increases (cuts) instead, also significantly increase (decrease)
mean excess NYSE-AMEX returns (by 15 and 58 basis points, respectively)
and decrease (increase) their conditional volatility. Hence, in both cases, the
eﬀect on the discount rate for future cash flows appears to dominate any
impact on expected cash flows, their perceived riskiness, and the state of the
economy. Table 5 further reveals that only unexpected negative payroll num-
bers and inflation have a significant impact on mean Treasury and corporate
bond holding-period returns, respectively. These eﬀects are consistent with
C (6) of Section 2, i.e., of negative sign (γpayi (0,−) < 0 and γ
cpi
i (0,+) < 0),
and follow the significantly greater return volatility induced by those “bad”
news the day before their announcement (δpayi (1,−) > 0 and δ
cpi
i (1,+) > 0).
Finally, the diﬀerential information content of macroeconomic news has
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little impact on the direction and intensity of excess comovement across as-
set classes induced by their arrival. However, the estimates of the DCC IMA
model of Eq. (5) in Table 6 display significant diﬀerences in sign and mag-
nitude of the impact of the release of good or bad news on intra-asset class
covariances, especially in proximity of the release of CPI data. For exam-
ple, the comovement between NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ holding-period
returns increases by roughly 110% on days when unexpected deflation news
are released (dcpii (0,−) = 1.092) but is mostly unchanged (d
cpi
i (0,+) is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero) in correspondence with unexpected in-
flation news. Lower comovement among classes of stock, government and
corporate bond returns usually precedes inflation news, but is quickly reab-
sorbed after their release. We instead estimate significantly and persistently
lower return covariances in proximity of deflation news. This suggests that
the these arrivals are more likely to induce a wave of rebalancing activity
among the asset classes in our sample. Along the same lines, target rate in-
creases induce lower comovement among high-rated and low-rated corporate
bonds than rate cuts, i.e., are more likely to induce investors to shift their
portfolios away from low-quality issuers.
7 Market eﬃciency and news arrivals
The conjectures listed in Section 2 stem from the underlying assumption that
the macroeconomic announcements in our sample represent indeed “news.”
Wemade this assumption operational in our empirical analysis by concentrat-
ing only on unexpected announcements, i.e., diﬀerent in sign and magnitude
from market consensus. This procedure is widely adopted in the literature.25
If information transmission is in fact the basic channel through which news
releases aﬀect the process of price formation in financial markets, then an-
ticipated announcements should have no discernible impact on conditional
returns, return volatility, and comovement. Hence, evidence of the contrary
would suggest that the many nuances and frictions of the trading mechanism
are important determinants of (excess) volatility and comovement within and
among asset returns in the U.S. stock, Treasury and corporate bond markets.
We explore this possibility by estimating the model of Eqs. (1) and
(3) for the subset of expected macroeconomic announcements in our sample,
according to the definitions in Section 4. The resulting parameters, reported
25Some recent examples are Bomfim and Reinhart (2000), Andersen et al. (2003, 2004),
Bomfim (2003), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), and Green (2004). Alternative procedures
involve the specification of statistical forecasting models to construct announcement sur-
prises, as in Boyd et al. (2004).
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in Table 7 for various GARCH(1,1) representations and in Table 8 for the
corresponding DCC IMA exponential smoothers, lead us to strongly reject
the conjecture C (7) that anticipated macroeconomic announcements should
have no impact on the fluctuations of corporate and government security
returns. In particular, we find that news arrivals of expected content are
often preceded by increasing, and then accompanied by declining conditional
bond return volatility (e.g., δi (1) = 0.246 and δi (1) = −0.288 for i = r10yt
in Panel A of Table 7). Yet, in most cases, these patterns do not translate
into greater mean excess holding-period returns. Expected announcements
do not generally increase the uncertainty in the stock market, but when
they do so (in correspondence with expected target rate decisions by the
Federal Reserve for the NYSE-AMEX, and nonfarm payroll numbers for the
NASDAQ), equity risk premia rise by roughly 20 basis points on average on
the day they took place.
This evidence, novel to the literature studying the U.S. financial markets,
is consistent with a recent study by Andersen et al. (2003) which shows that
the release of most macroeconomic data tends to boost exchange rate volatil-
ity, regardless of their information content. These findings oﬀer support to
the possibility raised by many recent theoretical studies (e.g., Fleming et
al., 1998; Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Yuan, 2005)
that the trading activity of investors and speculators (e.g., portfolio rebal-
ancing, market sentiment) and/or the existence of frictions and constraints
to its functioning (e.g., limits to borrowing and short-selling) may also sig-
nificantly aﬀect asset prices. Indeed, novel as well to this literature is the
evidence in Table 8, which shows that even the anticipated macroeconomic
announcements in our sample induce significantly lower return comovement
within and across asset classes, albeit less so than around news arrival dates.
Overall, these results suggest that, while stock and bond prices in the U.S.
financial markets do appear to be driven by fundamentals (consistently with
the previous analysis in Sections 5 and 6), excess volatility and comovement
play an important role in their dynamics and interaction.
8 Conclusions
The analysis of the extent to which prices in financial markets incorporate
fundamental information is central to the theoretical and empirical finance
literature. The traditional notion of market eﬃciency requires that informa-
tion about asset payoﬀs should be quickly and fully reflected in asset prices
and drive their dynamics. Much prior research has examined the links be-
tween financial and real variables by studying the eﬀects of the disclosure of
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macroeconomic information on stock and bond markets. Yet, this work has
often either ignored the implications of these announcements for the joint
distribution of stock and bond returns, focused only on their first or second
moments, or failed to identify the anticipated portion of those news releases.
More recent studies have also raised the possibility that a significant portion
of asset return volatility and covariation may instead be deemed “excessive.”
In particular, these studies have emphasized the increasing importance of the
trading activity of investors and speculators to explain return (co)movements.
Our paper contributes to this debate by providing a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the impact of both the unexpected and expected components of im-
portant U.S. macroeconomic news releases on the process of price formation
in the U.S. equity, government bond, and corporate bond markets. For that
purpose, we developed an extension of the DCC IMA model of Engle (2002)
that allows us to simultaneously (yet parsimoniously) identify the eﬀects of
news arrivals on conditional mean returns, return volatility, and return co-
variance. We estimated diﬀerent versions of this model over our sample of
announcements of target rate decisions by the Federal Reserve, CPI, Unem-
ployment, and Nonfarm Payroll data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
between 1986 and 2002.
We find that the arrival of macroeconomic news has a statistically and eco-
nomically significant impact on the U.S. financial markets, but also that this
impact varies greatly across asset classes. Conditional stock return volatility
decreases on the trading day before, increases on the day when the announce-
ments are made, and subsequently decreases, along the lines with the “calm
before the storm” hypothesis of Jones et al. (1998). Conditional bond re-
turn volatility instead increases when the news are released, and declines
afterward. This eﬀect is stronger for portfolios of bonds of shorter maturity
(the most liquid and sensitive to the mean-reverting nature of the short rate
drift) or more likely to default. Consistently, contemporaneous risk premia
decrease for stocks and increase for bonds. The estimated shifts in volatility
appear to be persistent in the short run, i.e., do not oﬀset each other com-
pletely over a three-day event window around the announcements. These
eﬀects are also strongly asymmetric: Their sign and magnitude depend on
whether the macroeconomic information released represented “good” versus
“bad” news. This evidence often diﬀers from some earlier studies in which
the surprise component of the announcements was not identified (e.g., Jones
et al., 1998). Somewhat surprisingly, we also find that even the release of
expected information is preceded and accompanied by a similar, significant
impact on the dynamics of both the Treasury and the corporate bond port-
folio returns, incompatibly with market eﬃciency.
Finally, our estimates paint a complex picture of the interaction between
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asset returns in proximity of news releases. Yet, they oﬀer little or no sup-
port to the notion that the arrival these news is accompanied by greater
comovement among asset returns. Indeed, return comovement within and
across stock and bond markets generally decreases in correspondence with
those announcements, albeit less so when anticipated by the market. These
findings suggest that the heterogeneous impact of news on investors’ trad-
ing activity and assets’ expected cash flows and risk premia, more than on
the rates at which future cash flows are discounted, may generate excessive
volatility and negative covariance among their returns.
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Table 3. GARCH model for excess returns: Surprise events
This table reports quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimates (and their robust t-
statistics (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992)) for the GARCH(1,1) model of Eq. (1):
rit = µi + ρir
i
t−1 + γi (0) It (0) + ε
i
t
εit =
p
hite
i
t
hit =
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
δi (k) It (k)
# h
ωi + αi
¡
εit−1
¢2
+ βih
i
t−1
i
where rit is the daily continuously compounded excess return on asset i (see Section 4). In
Panel A, It (k) = 1 if either a surprise Federal Reserve rate change (I
fed
t (k) = 1), or
a surprise CPI (Icpit (k) = 1), unemployment (I
une
t (k) = 1), or payroll announcement
(Ipayt (k) = 1) was made on day t+ k and zero otherwise; in Panel B, we consider each
event e separately (It (k) = I
e
t (k)). Returns are in percentage. Eq. (1) is estimated
over a sample from January 3, 1986 to February 14, 2002 (i.e., 4069 observations). Log L
is the value of the log likelihood function of Eq. (1) at convergence. A “ ∗ ”, “ ∗∗ ”, or “
∗∗∗ ” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: All events
rnyxt r
naq
t r
5y
t r
10y
t r
30y
t r
aaa
t r
baa
t
µi 0.057
∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
5.00 4.91 8.14 6.20 4.96 8.26 9.10
ρi 0.114
∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
6.68 10.24 4.57 4.92 2.77 5.78 4.64
γi (0) 0.095
∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.023 -0.037∗∗
2.07 2.66 -2 .88 -2 .36 -2 .00 -1.30 -2 .06
ωi 0.018∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
5.14 5.73 4.26 4.55 4.17 3.38 3.58
αi 0.114∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
10.80 11.31 7.37 7.46 7.07 8.24 8.17
βi 0.857
∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗
64.20 47.99 42.28 63.75 86.25 115.24 106.57
δi (−1) -0.246∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.108∗ -0.098∗ -0.048 -0.138∗∗ -0.127∗∗
-4 .74 -0 .72 -1 .89 -1 .71 -0 .80 -2.50 -2 .45
δi (0) 0.879∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗
5.69 2.53 -15.54 -11.10 -9 .89 -5.93 -8 .15
δi (1) -0.184∗∗∗ -0.070 1.533∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗
-3 .19 -0 .98 8.52 7.56 6.46 5.72 6.68
Log L -4853.61 -5803.54 -327.09 -2309.97 -4065.52 -1761.91 -1626.88
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Table 3 (Continued).
Panel B: Single events
rnyxt r
naq
t r
5y
t r
10y
t r
30y
t r
aaa
t r
baa
t
γfedi (0) 0.184 0.173 -0.020 -0.051 -0.080 -0.024 -0.031
1.55 1.32 -0 .55 -0 .86 -0 .90 -0 .57 -0 .63
δfedi (−1) -0.462∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗ -0.095 -0.194 -0.219∗ -0.186 -0.271∗∗
-5 .01 -5 .24 -0 .62 -1 .45 -1 .67 -1 .42 -2 .25
δfedi (0) 0.681
∗ 0.729∗ -0.312∗∗ 0.022 0.344 -0.085 0.050
1.83 1.95 -1 .98 0.10 1.11 -0 .43 0.21
δfedi (1) 0.044 0.070 0.903
∗∗∗ 0.301 -0.051 0.349 0.460∗
0.26 0.40 2.80 1.42 -0 .33 1.59 1.94
γcpii (0) 0.063 0.098 -0.035 -0.048 -0.093
∗ -0.053∗ -0.053∗
0.84 1.34 -1 .57 -1 .34 -1 .73 -1 .84 -1 .81
δcpii (−1) -0.136 0.057 0.085 0.067 0.144 -0.153 -0.135
-1.56 0.51 0.63 0.50 1.10 -1 .51 -1 .32
δcpii (0) 0.952
∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗
3.63 2.84 -4 .28 -2 .88 -4 .20 -2 .26 -3 .61
δcpii (1) -0.167 -0.294
∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
-1 .62 -3 .42 3.02 2.11 2.40 2.06 2.89
γunei (0) 0.022 0.056 -0.029 -0.031 -0.011 0.011 -0.004
0.30 0.80 -1 .60 -0 .99 -0 .22 0.40 -0 .14
δunei (−1) -0.244∗∗∗ -0.051 0.381∗∗ 0.239 0.234 0.042 0.234
-2.81 -0 .47 2.27 1.58 1.57 0.34 1.61
δunei (0) 0.901
∗∗∗ 0.277 -0.761∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗
3.23 1.49 -20.50 -13.96 -12.35 -5 .28 -8 .06
δunei (1) -0.203
∗∗ -0.084 2.180∗∗∗ 1.800∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗
-2 .09 -0 .77 6.04 5.67 5.25 4.16 4.38
γpayi (0) 0.008 0.009 -0.054
∗∗∗ -0.062∗ -0.062 0.003 -0.021
0.11 0.13 -2 .83 -1 .90 -1 .21 0.10 -0 .79
δpayi (−1) -0.209∗∗ -0.031 0.188 0.042 0.039 -0.009 -0.008
-2.57 -0 .29 1.32 0.34 0.32 -0 .09 -0 .07
δpayi (0) 0.829
∗∗∗ 0.196 -0.753∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗
3.43 1.19 -20.19 -13.49 -10.81 -6 .92 -9 .12
δpayi (1) -0.162
∗ 0.063 2.594∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗
-1 .65 0.52 6.52 6.02 5.59 5.04 5.29
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Table 4. DCC IMA model: Surprise events
This table reports intra and across-asset class averages of quasi-maximum likelihood
(QML) estimates (and of their robust t-statistics (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992)) for
the DCC IMA model of Eq. (3) from the standardized residuals of the GARCH(1,1) model
of Eq. (1):
eite
j
t =
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
di (k) It (k)
#
eit−1e
j
t−1 +
+
¡
qijt − eitejt
¢
− λ
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
di (k) It (k)
# ¡
qijt−1 − eit−1ejt−1
¢
where eit =
εit√
hit
is the daily standardized error from the expression for rit, the excess
return on asset i, in Eq. (1). In Panel A, It (k) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if either
a surprise Federal Reserve rate change took place, or a surprise CPI, unemployment, or
payroll announcement was made on day t + k and zero otherwise. In Panel B, Eq. (3)
is estimated separately for each surprise event, i.e., replacing It (k) with I
e
t (k) = 1
if a surprise Federal Reserve (e = fed), CPI (e = cpi), unemployment (e = une),
or payroll (e = pay) event took place on day t + k and zero otherwise. Returns are
expressed in percentage, i.e., multiplied by 100. Eq. (3) is estimated over a sample from
January 3, 1986 to February 14, 2002, i.e., over 4069 observations. The Stock category
is made of i = nyx, naq; the Govt category is made of i = 5y, 10y, 30y; the Corp
category is made of i = aaa, baa. Averages are calculated for estimates of the dummy
coeﬃcients di (k) among and across asset classes.
Panel A: All events
di (−1) di (0) di (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock 0.164 -0.065 -1.445 0.301 -0.945 -0.965 -0.786 -1.038 -0.957
3.28 1.10 -31.90 5.20 -16.66 -18.37 -20.29 -25.00 -22.83
Govt 1.002 -0.493 -0.712 -0.593 -0.387 -0.461
12.73 -9 .78 -15.41 -11.56 -8 .29 -8 .70
Corp -0.506 -0.196 -0.032
-14.89 -5 .12 -0 .54
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Table 4 (Continued).
Panel B: Single events
dfedi (−1) d
fed
i (0) d
fed
i (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.600 -1.007 -1.124 -1.915 -0.815 -1.013 -0.875 -1.200 -1.098
-8.02 -12.66 -12.43 -19.05 -11.20 -11.85 -21.26 -17.86 -13.56
Govt -0.546 -0.431 -0.029 -0.418 -0.548 -0.564
-7.48 -5 .74 -0 .30 -4 .30 -9 .93 -7 .53
Corp -0.253 -0.128 0.180
-3.14 -1 .44 1.66
dcpii (−1) d
cpi
i (0) d
cpi
i (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock 0.861 -0.396 -1.892 1.184 -0.814 -0.721 -0.676 -1.052 -0.913
7.74 -1.38 -31.22 8.47 -14.35 -12.55 -15.47 -13.95 -15.80
Govt 2.200 -1.309 -0.425 -0.830 -0.382 -0.858
11.05 -17.71 -8 .41 -14.34 -7 .36 -13.92
Corp -0.237 -0.260 0.017
-4.53 -4 .58 0.24
dunei (−1) dunei (0) dunei (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.208 -0.931 -1.011 -0.192 -1.106 -0.816 -1.461 -1.011 -1.003
-3.44 -17.11 -22.06 -3 .10 -12.32 -13.88 -21.52 -15.54 -15.39
Govt -0.691 -0.476 -0.253 -0.462 -1.699 -1.445
-15.92 -12.79 -4 .55 -6 .23 -26.32 -22.84
Corp -0.106 0.312 -0.224
-1.63 3.69 -3 .87
dpayi (−1) d
pay
i (0) d
pay
i (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.619 -0.968 -0.966 -1.977 -0.888 -1.035 -1.477 -0.998 -0.991
-14.69 -20.14 -17.17 -27.63 -13.70 -20.43 -27.05 -18.54 -15.58
Govt -0.557 -0.332 -0.349 -0.530 -1.827 -1.035
-12.99 -8 .62 -6 .88 -8 .22 -28.61 -15.98
Corp 0.027 0.254 -0.082
0.41 3.22 -1 .35
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Table 5. GARCH model for excess returns: Asymmetric impact
This table reports quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimates (and their robust t-
statistics (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992)) for the GARCH(1,1) model of Eq. (4):
rit = µi + ρir
i
t−1 + γ
e
i (0,+) I
e
t (0,+) + γ
e
i (0,−) Iet (0,−) + εit
εit =
p
hite
i
t
hit =
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
δei (k,+) I
e
t (k,+) +
+1X
k=−1
δei (k,−) Iet (k,−)
#
·
·
h
ωi + αi
¡
εit−1
¢2
+ βih
i
t−1
i
where rit is the daily continuously compounded excess return on asset i (described in
Section 4) and e = fed, cpi, une, or pay are the surprise macroeconomic events in
our sample such that Ifedt (k,+) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Federal Reserve
announced a surprise rate increase on day t + k and zero otherwise, Ifedt (k,−) is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the Federal Reserve announced a surprise rate decrease or if
rates were surprisingly unchanged on day t+k and zero otherwise, Icpit (k,+) is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the CPI was reported at day t + k to have surprisingly increased
with respect to the previous month and zero otherwise, Icpit (k,−) is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the CPI was reported on day t+ k to have surprisingly decreased or to have
surprisingly remained unchanged with respect to the previous month and zero otherwise,
Iunet (k,+) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the unemployment rate was reported on day
t+k to have surprisingly increased with respect to the previous month and zero otherwise,
Iunet (k,−) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the unemployment rate was reported on
day t+k to have surprisingly decreased or to have surprisingly remained unchanged with
respect to the previous month and zero otherwise, Ipayt (k,+) is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the nonfarm payroll was reported on day t + k to have surprisingly increased or
to have surprisingly remained unchanged with respect to the previous month and zero
otherwise, and finally Ipayt (k,−) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the nonfarm payroll
was reported on day t + k to have surprisingly decreased with respect to the previous
month and zero otherwise. Returns are expressed in percentage, i.e., multiplied by 100.
Eq. (4) is estimated over a sample from January 3, 1986 to February 14, 2002, i.e., over
4069 observations. A “ ∗ ”, “ ∗∗ ”, or “ ∗∗∗ ” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 5 (Continued).
Daily excess holding-period returns
rnyxt r
naq
t r
5y
t r
10y
t r
30y
t r
aaa
t r
baa
t
γfedi (0,+) -0.237 -0.393 -0.008 -0.049 -0.135 -0.123 -0.157
-0.83 -1.55 -0 .16 -0 .57 -1 .06 -0 .98 -1 .28
γfedi (0,−) 0.334∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.053 -0.068 -0.008 -0.001
1.96 2.91 -0 .60 -0 .74 -0 .63 -0 .14 -0 .02
δfedi (−1,+) -0.557∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ 1.436∗ 1.087 0.932 0.205 -0.271
-3.63 -2.72 1.77 1.55 1.44 0.42 -0 .37
δfedi (0,+) 2.193 1.023 -0.596
∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.276 0.474
1.37 1.12 -3 .15 -2 .95 -2 .90 -0 .62 0.36
δfedi (1,+) -0.269 0.137 0.541 0.613 0.421 0.253 0.231
-0.57 0.36 1.02 1.11 0.86 0.29 0.21
δfedi (−1,−) -0.363∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.248 -0.242
-2.55 -3.37 -1 .99 -2 .74 -2 .81 -1 .54 -1 .25
δfedi (0,−) 0.258 0.408 -0.261 0.218 0.798∗ -0.060 -0.089
0.40 1.18 -1 .35 0.69 1.70 -0 .21 -0 .32
δfedi (1,−) 0.140 0.058 1.044∗∗∗ 0.245 -0.183 0.394 0.554
0.49 0.29 2.64 1.02 -1 .18 0.96 1.40
γcpii (0,+) 0.151
∗∗ 0.173 -0.032 -0.045 -0.082 -0.056∗ -0.059∗
2.27 1.51 -1 .06 -1 .20 -1 .16 -1 .84 -1 .90
γcpii (0,−) -0.582∗ -0.487 -0.053 -0.079 -0.157 -0.019 0.002
-1.83 -1.17 -0 .58 -0 .64 -1 .23 -0 .22 0.03
δcpii (−1,+) 0.179 0.237 0.207 0.139 0.016 -0.167 -0.144
1.33 1.25 1.22 0.92 0.13 -1 .59 -1 .32
δcpii (0,+) 0.650
∗∗ 0.409 -0.342∗ -0.283∗∗ -0.183 -0.155 -0.279∗∗
2.50 0.91 -1 .79 -2 .41 -1 .42 -1 .16 -2 .41
δcpii (1,+) -0.374
∗∗∗ -0.382 0.271 0.199 0.196 0.198 0.361∗∗
-4 .66 -3.88 1.43 1.35 1.00 1.32 2.10
δcpii (−1,−) -0.649∗∗∗ -0.241 -0.470∗∗ -0.284 0.566 0.087 -0.041
-7.42 -1.13 -2 .15 -1 .19 1.12 0.24 -0 .13
δcpii (0,−) 0.064 0.630 -0.460∗∗ -0.338 -0.781∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗∗
0.18 1.01 -2 .03 -1 .36 -13.53 -4 .28 -3 .69
δcpii (1,−) 3.249∗∗ 0.488 1.957∗ 0.991∗ 1.765 0.935∗ 1.235∗∗
2.05 0.58 1.86 1.77 1.63 1.70 1.99
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Table 5 (Continued).
Daily excess holding-period returns
rnyxt r
naq
t r
5y
t r
10y
t r
30y
t r
aaa
t r
baa
t
γunei (0,+) -0.088 -0.078 -0.045 -0.053 -0.041 0.021 -0.017
-0.62 -0 .57 -1.31 -0 .90 -0 .45 0.39 -0 .37
γunei (0,−) 0.081 0.123 -0.020 -0.019 0.006 0.004 0.004
0.80 1.62 -0.80 -0 .53 0.11 0.15 0.13
δunei (−1,+) -0.287∗ -0.236 0.311 -0.064 -0.133 -0.275∗ 0.079
-1.85 -1 .60 0.91 -0 .35 -0 .80 -1 .91 0.37
δunei (0,+) 0.998
∗ 0.463 -0.791∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -0.211 -0.439∗∗∗
1.66 1.27 -7.84 -6 .49 -4 .85 -1 .00 -2 .95
δunei (1,+) -0.091 0.108 3.000
∗∗∗ 2.180∗∗∗ 1.589∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
-0 .40 0.51 3.49 3.49 3.11 2.69 2.61
δunei (−1,−) -0.215∗ 0.135 0.457 0.550∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.352∗
-1 .84 0.85 1.31 2.35 2.58 1.97 1.78
δunei (0,−) 0.844∗ 0.138 -0.749∗∗∗ -0.724∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.600∗∗∗
1.65 0.66 -13.37 -14.11 -13.68 -7 .64 -8 .40
δunei (1,−) -0.263∗∗ -0.196 1.781∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
-2 .04 -1 .63 2.80 4.52 4.27 3.12 3.58
γpayi (0,+) 0.034 0.046 -0.056
∗∗∗ -0.063∗ -0.053 -0.002 -0.007
0.42 0.59 -2.70 -1 .87 -0 .96 -0 .09 -0 .19
γpayi (0,−) -0.097 -0.240 -0.049 -0.061 -0.094 0.011 -0.082
-0.75 -1 .39 -1.15 -0 .75 -0 .74 0.15 -1 .23
δpayi (−1,+) -0.248∗∗∗ -0.111 0.230 0.251 0.252 0.346∗∗ 0.074
-2.89 -1 .02 1.40 1.50 0.90 1.97 0.42
δpayi (0,+) 0.900
∗∗∗ 0.200 -0.782∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗
3.20 1.07 -20.87 -16.20 -8 .86 -10.48 -9 .65
δpayi (1,+) -0.153 0.068 2.636
∗∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗
-1 .30 0.47 5.91 5.47 2.02 4.35 3.03
δpayi (−1,−) 0.053 0.404 0.108 -0.321∗ -0.293 -0.465∗∗∗ -0.144
0.22 1.22 0.40 -1 .94 -1 .40 -3 .48 -0 .75
δpayi (0,−) 0.367 -0.019 -0.664∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗ -0.405∗ 0.019 -0.363∗
0.88 -0 .07 -6.05 -2 .09 -1 .92 0.06 -1 .70
δpayi (1,−) -0.156 0.113 2.344∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗ 1.212∗∗ 1.200∗∗
-0 .82 0.45 2.91 2.59 2.34 2.47 2.32
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Table 6 (Continued).
dfedi (−1,+) d
fed
i (0,+) d
fed
i (1,+)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.942 -1.118 -1.002 -1.670 -0.980 -0.991 -0.742 -1.090 -0.916
-9.64 -7 .59 -6 .61 -9 .83 -6 .98 -8 .04 -5 .57 -7 .38 -5 .33
Govt -0.061 0.111 -0.903 -1.054 -1.474 -1.361
-0.32 0.51 -5 .80 -6 .51 -8 .89 -8 .41
Corp 0.375 -1.766 -0.347
1.48 -9.69 -2 .30
dfedi (−1,−) d
fed
i (0,−) d
fed
i (1,−)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.426 -1.012 -0.817 -0.199 -0.678 -1.050 -0.885 -1.127 -1.128
-5.17 -13.40 -9 .41 -2 .09 -8 .25 -10.21 -22.11 -15.73 -13.51
Govt -0.847 -0.805 -0.709 -0.361 -0.537 -0.564
-14.28 -12.54 -5 .93 -2 .89 -9 .62 -7 .46
Corp -0.554 -2.131 0.278
-7.90 -15.84 2.12
dcpii (−1,+) d
cpi
i (0,+) d
cpi
i (1,+)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock 0.631 -0.396 -1.867 -0.046 -1.045 -0.607 -0.569 -1.054 -0.853
6.31 -1.02 -28.39 -0 .60 -12.44 -9 .05 -10.58 -11.01 -12.52
Govt 2.532 -1.370 -0.448 -0.481 -0.370 -0.580
10.68 -14.98 -7 .48 -7 .89 -5 .89 -8 .90
Corp -0.082 -0.282 -0.457
-1.21 -4 .43 -7 .44
dcpii (−1,−) d
cpi
i (0,−) d
cpi
i (1,−)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -2.144 -0.959 -1.317 1.092 -1.550 -1.014 -0.974 -1.006 -1.012
-10.43 -6 .68 -8 .12 2.91 -7 .73 -6 .89 -8 .41 -8 .08 -8 .48
Govt -0.816 -0.984 -0.641 -0.870 -0.559 -1.509
-6.16 -10.12 -4 .94 -5 .32 -3 .66 -6 .98
Corp -0.896 -0.784 0.683
-14.84 -4 .91 2.34
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Table 6 (Continued).
dunei (−1,+) dunei (0,+) dunei (1,+)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.381 -0.885 -1.029 -0.237 -1.126 -0.962 -0.601 -0.913 -1.006
-4.73 -12.92 -14.53 -2 .59 -10.14 -9 .52 -8 .60 -7 .38 -10.14
Govt -0.414 -0.021 0.029 -0.729 -1.210 -0.876
-6.50 -5 .45 0.11 -4 .83 -13.15 -9 .75
Corp 0.642 0.431 -0.345
3.87 2.96 -4 .37
dunei (−1,−) dunei (0,−) dunei (1,−)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock 0.000 -0.953 -0.999 -0.167 -1.175 -1.101 -1.627 -1.027 -1.037
0.00 -11.12 -15.07 -2 .17 -15.34 -14.86 -22.94 -15.68 -14.45
Govt -0.769 -0.815 -0.765 -0.860 -0.184 -0.464
-14.16 -13.40 -15.53 -18.36 -2 .46 -5 .65
Corp -0.743 -0.711 -0.080
-14.36 -14.25 -1 .01
dpayi (−1,+) d
pay
i (0,+) d
pay
i (1,+)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.645 -1.004 -1.027 -0.026 -1.104 -0.997 -1.446 -0.979 -0.934
-14.41 -15.47 -17.28 -0 .34 -14.06 -12.49 -25.17 -17.18 -14.49
Govt -0.633 -0.750 -0.594 -0.691 -0.721 -0.369
-14.52 -17.47 -12.45 -14.52 -9 .70 -4 .91
Corp -0.470 -0.605 0.068
-10.23 -13.07 0.88
dpayi (−1,−) d
pay
i (0,−) d
pay
i (1,−)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.457 -0.909 -1.062 -0.321 -1.229 -0.949 -0.388 -1.165 -1.189
-5.21 -12.55 -14.35 -3 .27 -11.77 -8 .54 -3 .81 -10.66 -11.15
Govt -0.262 -2.239 -0.158 0.002 -1.201 -0.768
-3.79 -11.52 -1 .42 -0 .14 -11.42 -8 .61
Corp 1.148 0.239 -0.377
4.41 1.53 -4 .44
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Table 7. GARCH model for excess returns: Expected events
This table reports quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimates (and their robust t-
statistics (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992)) for the GARCH(1,1) model of Eq. (1):
rit = µi + ρir
i
t−1 + γi (0) It (0) + ε
i
t
εit =
p
hite
i
t
hit =
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
δi (k) It (k)
# h
ωi + αi
¡
εit−1
¢2
+ βih
i
t−1
i
where rit is the daily continuously compounded excess return on asset i (see Section 4). In
Panel A, It (k) = 1 if either an expected Federal Reserve rate change (I
fed
t (k) = 1), or
an expected CPI (Icpit (k) = 1), unemployment (I
une
t (k) = 1), or payroll announcement
(Ipayt (k) = 1) was made on day t+ k and zero otherwise; in Panel B, we consider each
event e separately (It (k) = I
e
t (k)). Returns are in percentage. Eq. (1) is estimated
over a sample from January 3, 1986 to February 14, 2002 (i.e., 4069 observations). Log L
is the value of the log likelihood function of Eq. (1) at convergence. A “ ∗ ”, “ ∗∗ ”, or “
∗∗∗ ” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: All events
rnyxt r
naq
t r
5y
t r
10y
t r
30y
t r
aaa
t r
baa
t
µi 0.062
∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
5.41 5.54 7.03 5.23 4.23 7.60 8.15
ρi 0.109
∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
6.35 10.16 4.10 4.30 2.26 5.79 4.36
γi (0) 0.091 0.042 0.001 0.035 0.062 0.047
∗ 0.032
1.44 0.66 0.06 1.10 1.23 1.89 1.37
ωi 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
4.84 6.45 4.29 4.19 3.77 2.91 3.32
αi 0.107∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
9.38 11.19 7.10 6.91 6.65 8.01 7.78
βi 0.875
∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
65.65 64.59 59.55 76.28 120.74 126.79 124.25
δi (−1) -0.100 -0.035 0.018 0.058 0.133 0.102 0.249∗
-1 .04 -0 .33 0.15 0.51 1.16 0.90 1.92
δi (0) 0.169 -0.019 -0.260∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
1.05 -0 .13 -2 .45 -2 .91 -2.95 -2 .49 -3 .04
δi (1) -0.035 0.033 0.157 0.246∗ 0.252∗∗ 0.174 0.024
-0.34 0.29 1.27 1.86 2.03 1.42 0.23
Log L -4886.51 -5805.24 -447.53 -2381.91 -4110.78 -1790.91 -1671.64
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Table 7 (Continued).
Panel B: Single events
rnyxt r
naq
t r
5y
t r
10y
t r
30y
t r
aaa
t r
baa
t
γfedi (0) 0.201
∗∗∗ 0.091 0.025 0.073 0.115∗ 0.061∗ 0.042
2.77 1.18 0.90 1.61 1.65 1.84 1.40
δfedi (−1) 0.349∗ 0.132 -0.076 -0.041 0.052 -0.041 0.151
1.85 0.80 -0.57 -0 .29 0.32 -0 .28 0.94
δfedi (0) 0.225 0.142 0.379 0.433 0.453 0.106 0.031
1.08 0.66 1.55 1.63 1.62 0.46 0.16
δfedi (1) -0.317
∗∗∗ -0.139 -0.270∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.111 -0.262∗∗
-3 .54 -1 .13 -2.74 -2 .81 -2 .65 -0 .87 -2 .43
γcpii (0) -0.017 -0.019 -0.029 -0.020 -0.028 0.033 0.025
-0.16 -0 .18 -1.00 -0 .42 -0 .38 0.82 0.66
δcpii (−1) -0.342∗∗∗ -0.162 0.081 0.051 0.113 0.164 0.352
-2.90 -1 .06 0.44 0.29 0.61 0.87 1.56
δcpii (0) 0.005 -0.113 -0.586
∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗
0.02 -0 .56 -6.28 -5 .94 -6 .45 -3 .10 -4 .38
δcpii (1) 0.331 0.273 0.736
∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.410∗ 0.444∗
1.51 1.26 2.42 2.68 2.73 1.71 1.82
γunei (0) 0.071 0.115 -0.089
∗∗∗ -0.103∗ -0.143 -0.024 -0.072
0.64 0.92 -2.61 -1 .81 -1 .61 -0 .52 -1 .38
δunei (−1) -0.158 0.058 -0.103 -0.055 -0.029 -0.039 -0.215
-1.14 0.30 -0.60 -0 .31 -0 .16 -0 .22 -1 .50
δunei (0) 0.387 -0.245 -0.723
∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗
1.35 -1 .48 -10.65 -7 .52 -6 .14 -4 .13 -4 .72
δunei (1) -0.165 0.320 2.290
∗∗∗ 1.658∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 1.356∗∗∗
-1 .02 1.32 3.84 3.49 3.22 2.85 3.27
γpayi (0) 0.122 0.226
∗∗ -0.020 -0.009 0.013 0.003 -0.016
1.10 2.26 -0.63 -0 .17 0.17 0.05 -0 .32
δpayi (−1) -0.074 0.304 0.392 0.583∗ 0.616∗ 0.047 0.192
-0.38 1.19 1.34 1.75 1.82 0.21 0.76
δpayi (0) 0.249 -0.360
∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗ -0.232 -0.291
0.73 -2.12 -9.76 -8 .93 -8 .88 -1 .04 -1 .40
δpayi (1) -0.219 0.050 1.496
∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗ 0.214 0.240
-1.33 0.23 2.81 2.66 2.50 0.83 0.90
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Table 8. DCC IMA model: Expected events
This table reports intra and across-asset class averages of quasi-maximum likelihood
(QML) estimates (and of their robust t-statistics (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992)) for
the DCC IMA model of Eq. (3) from the standardized residuals of the GARCH(1,1) model
of Eq. (1):
eite
j
t = e
i
t−1e
j
t−1
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
di (k) It (k)
#
+
+
¡
qijt − eitejt
¢
− λ
"
1 +
+1X
k=−1
di (k) It (k)
# ¡
qijt−1 − eit−1ejt−1
¢
where eit =
εit√
hit
is the daily standardized error from the expression for rit, the excess
return on asset i, in Eq. (1). In Panel A, It (k) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if either
an expected Federal Reserve rate change took place, or an expected CPI, unemployment,
or payroll announcement was made on day t + k and zero otherwise. In Panel B, Eq.
(3) is estimated separately for each expected event, i.e., replacing It (k) with I
e
t (k) = 1
if an expected Federal Reserve (e = fed), CPI (e = cpi), unemployment (e = une),
or payroll (e = pay) event took place on day t + k and zero otherwise. Returns are
expressed in percentage, i.e., multiplied by 100. Eq. (3) is estimated over a sample from
January 3, 1986 to February 14, 2002, i.e., over 4069 observations. The Stock category
is made of i = nyx, naq; the Govt category is made of i = 5y, 10y, 30y; the Corp
category is made of i = aaa, baa. Averages are calculated for estimates of the dummy
coeﬃcients di (k) among and across asset classes.
Panel A: All events
di (−1) di (0) di (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.794 -0.904 -0.890 -0.424 -1.026 -0.892 -0.146 -1.016 -0.952
-18.32 -15.04 -16.19 -9 .03 -18.55 -12.24 -2 .64 -21.80 -20.42
Govt -0.198 -1.461 -0.493 -0.613 -0.358 -0.498
-3.71 -26.54 -11.65 -14.51 -7 .69 -11.32
Corp -1.774 -0.440 -0.343
-29.19 -10.10 -7 .20
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Table 8 (Continued).
Panel B: Single events
dfedi (−1) d
fed
i (0) d
fed
i (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.908 -0.987 -0.880 -0.741 -0.975 -0.986 -1.746 -1.126 -0.942
-16.17 -14.23 -12.79 -10.62 -16.80 -14.56 -20.37 -13.29 -12.00
Govt -0.563 -0.806 -0.734 -0.811 -0.310 -0.648
-9.58 -11.13 -12.27 -13.09 -4 .32 -7 .82
Corp -0.543 -0.726 -0.016
-9.13 -11.17 -0 .19
dcpii (−1) d
cpi
i (0) d
cpi
i (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.422 -0.757 -0.968 -0.175 -1.017 -0.652 -0.049 -0.995 -0.937
-6.80 -14.76 -19.00 -2 .14 -19.82 -12.44 -0 .54 -19.27 -15.50
Govt -0.621 -1.375 -0.475 -0.542 -0.403 -0.440
-4.94 -13.06 -8 .28 -9 .98 -6 .59 -7 .52
Corp -0.081 -0.519 -0.437
-0.94 -10.27 -7 .57
dunei (−1) dunei (0) dunei (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock -0.402 -1.187 -0.926 -0.156 -1.174 -1.170 -0.687 -0.930 -0.936
-5.09 -11.67 -10.64 -1 .57 -12.72 -13.02 -8 .57 -10.24 -10.03
Govt -0.507 -0.516 -0.641 -0.656 -1.390 -2.047
-7.25 -7 .47 -9 .08 -8 .87 -11.51 -16.75
Corp -0.213 -1.598 0.053
-2.69 -16.54 0.46
dpayi (−1) d
pay
i (0) d
pay
i (1)
Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp Stock Govt Corp
Stock 0.784 -1.190 -0.939 -0.624 -1.177 -1.302 -0.703 -0.868 -0.938
3.92 -10.56 -8 .76 -7 .89 -12.40 -13.97 -8 .97 -5 .73 -8 .02
Govt -0.796 -0.809 -0.534 -0.766 -1.221 -0.724
-9.91 -9 .96 -6 .33 -7 .93 -10.87 -8 .14
Corp -0.564 -1.623 -0.614
-8.01 -13.85 -7 .60
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